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DECIDING CUSTODY OF FROZEN EMBRYOS:
MANY EGGS ARE FROZEN
BUT WHO IS CHOSEN?
Peter E. Malo*
INTRODUCTION
Utopias seem more realizable than we ever before believed.
And we find before us a most anguishing question: How can
we avoid their actual realization?... Utopias are realizable.
Life marches toward utopias. And perhaps, as a new centiry
begins, intellectuals and the cultured class will dream of the
means to avoid utopias and to return to a non-utopian
society, less "perfect" and more free. I
A continuing interplay exists today between societal values and
technological advancements in biology and medicine, with each
*Case Brief Editor, DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW, Adjunct Faculty, Division
of Science and Health Careers, Oakton Community College, DesPlaines, IL. B.S., Vestfield
State College, 1975; M.A., Western Michigan University, 1978; Ph.D., Drexel Uni~crsity,
1988; M.P.M. Keller Graduate School of Management 1995; M.B.A.. E eller Graduate School
of Management, 1996; J.D. (Cand.) DePaul University, 2000.
'See ALDOUS Hma.Ey, BRAVE NEW WORLD & BRAVE NEW WOL1 REViSrE (1960)
(quoting Nicholas Berdiaeff "Les utopies apparaissent comme bien plus realsables qu'on In
le croyalt autrefois. Et nous trouvons actuellement de'ant une question bien autrement
angoissante: Comment eviter leur realisation definitive? ...Les utopies sont rcalisabfes La vtc
marche vers les utopies. Et peut-etre un siecle nouveau commence-t-., un sieele au tes
intellectuels et la classe cultivee reveront aur moyens d'eviter les ulopies el de rotczrnzr a un2
societe non utopique, moins 'parfaite' et plus libre." English translation pro% ided by Monica
Smith Gelinas).
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constantly influencing the other. But as technology continues to gain
momentum, it threatens to outstrip any remaining societal or ethical
control, this is like the biological equivalent to the Manhattan Project
Nowhere is this more apparent than in genetic or reproductive
technologies. The first successful birth of a child by in vitro
fertilization (IVF) was Louise Brown in Great Britain, on July 25,
1978.? As a result of that birth, IVF, as part of a field of assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs), is now a billion-dollar industry.4
IVF provides a procreative opportunity to couples experiencing
infertility due to a variety of medical problems. IVF is typically used
when a pathologic Fallopian tube cannot transport eggs to the uterus
where fertilization by the sperm and implantation into the uterine wall
must occur.5 In an effort to solve the problem of infertility, the field of
IVF has undergone continual scientific refinement. Consequently, IVF
is now capable of providing such procedures as gamete6 intrafallopian
transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, superovulation and transvaginal
ultrasound-directed oocyte recovery! ARTs now exist for the five
million three hundred thousand Americans who are reproductively
infertile.8
Given these advances, complex issues have arisen. In 1995, 70
percent of the ARTs performed utilized IVF, resulting in only a twenty-
2See THE NEW YoRK PUBLIC LIBRARY SCIENCE DESK REFERENCE 305 (1995) (describing
the Manhattan Project as the American effort directed by Julius Oppenheimer to build the first
atomic bomb).3See Meena Lal, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 519, 520 (1997).
4See id. at 520.
5See Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV.
305, 306-07 (1993).
6A gamete is a mature male or female reproductive cell, spermatozoon or ovum, See
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY G-4 (1997).
7See Lal, supra note 3, at 518.
8See Donna Katz, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding
Which Party Receives Custody of Frozen Preembyros, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 623, 624
(1998) (citing Kathleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and
the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 195 (1997).
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two percent live birth rate.9 IVF is extremely expensive. The typical
costs associated with IVF range between $8,000 and $10,000 per
completed procedure (which includes medical consultations, laboratory
tests, drugs and egg retrieval, culturing, and transfer.)" The process of
IVF is also very comprehensive, as it is usually carried out in five
steps."
Additionally, since women undergoing IVF are faced with
significant medical risks, 2 doctors now retrieve, fertilize and then
cryogenically freeze excess eggs for possible future implantation,
should the initial attempt fail. 3 Freezing fertilized eggs for future
implantation minimizes the physiological manipulation of the woman's
9See i at 629 (citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reprodtctwe
Technology Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports, fig. 7, (visited
Mar. 28, 1998) < http'/IwvAv.cdc.gov.ncedphpdrhfarts>)).
'See id. (citing Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IIVF Issues and
Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1215, 1226, 1221 (1997)).
"See Lal, supra note 3, at 520-22 (explaining that the first step is patient screening.
Previous medical histories of both partners are extensively reviewed to determine applicability
of IVF as a solution for their infertility problem. Ovulation induction and monitoring follovs.
After a patient has been accepted into an IVF program, the process begins with a zequence of
chemical and hormonal injections into the woman's ovaries to stimulate oulation and the
release of multiple eggs (a process known as "superovulation"). All cycles are ntimulated by
clomiphene citrate and human menopausal gonadotropin followed by human chorionic
gonadotropin (HCG). The third phase is ova aspiration. Once a patient's ectrogen ha-
increased, eggs are released following an injection of HCG. Eggs are removed by lap2rozcopic
retrieval. A laparoscopy is a procedure performed under anesthesia, in vhich the ph.sician
places two tubes in the woman's abdomen near the naval; the doctor then obzerves the ovary
through a scope attached to one of the tubes. A hollow needle is then passed through the other
tube and the eggs are gently vacuumed out of the body cavity. In vitro fertilization is the
fourth step. Eggs are placed into a dish to which the donor's sperm is added. Two to four days
after fertilization and once cell division has progressed to the four to eight cell stage, the
physician performs the fifth part, embryonic transfer back into either the genetic mother or to a
non-genetic surrogate mother, by injecting several fertilized pre-embryos into the woman's
cervical canal with a syringe-like catheter. Implantation will occur, if at all, %, ithin 2 weeks
after this transfer).
'
2See Katz, supra note 8, at 629 ("including ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome,
bleeding, infection, cysts, anesthesia-related complications, and possibly an increased risk of
thromboembolism, stroke myocardial infarction and ovarian cancer, as well as difficult
pregnancies and deliveries," citing Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover II7? Issues and
Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1215, 1226 (1997)).
13See id. (citing Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues
Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 550
(1996)).
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reproductive system because the hormonal preparation for egg retrieval
is only implemented once. 4 Hormonal preparation for implantation,
then, will be the only physiological manipulation left to endure. 5
While such a practice provides medical benefit, it also exposes the
couple to a potential legal dilemma. Specifically, what happens when,
or if, the frozen genetic material from two individuals is no longer
needed? This problem involves the volatile mixing of cutting edge IVF
with an age-old problem of parental custody. Strewn upon this legal
"no-man's" land like proverbial land mines are countless emotionally
charged issues: Should control of pre-zygote material automatically
vest in the woman when she desires implantation? Or should
disposition of the genetic material go to the party wishing to avoid
procreation? Should both genetic donors have rights to the pre-zygotes
that may be contractually negotiated?
Courts are increasingly being forced to deal with this issue of
frozen embryo custody. An Illinois court recently issued a temporary
restraining order to prevent a woman "from implanting two frozen
embryos against the wishes of her estranged husband."' 6 In February
1999, Margaret Hale and Todd Ginestra signed a contract with
Highland Park Hospital's In vitro Fertilization Center. Margaret
subsequently had eggs removed, fertilized with Todd's sperm and
frozen for future use.'7 Shortly afterward, the couple initiated divorce
proceedings.' Currently, both husband and wife contend the contract
they signed contains contradictory information: "one part stat[ing] that
the couple agreed to have the embryos frozen, but a handwritten note in
the contract states the opposite."' 9 "The court likely will consider first
4See id. at 629-30 (citing Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal
Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED, 547, 550
(1996) and Jennifer Maigliano Dehmel, To Have or Have Not: Whose Procreative Rights
Prevail in Disputes Over Disposition of Frozen Embryos? 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1380
(1995)).
"
5See id.
16Jeremy Manier, Order on Embryos Still in Effect, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1999, Sec. 2 at
15.
'
7See id.
"See id.191d.
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the issue of whether the embryos can be implanted-and, if not; [sic]
whether they should be destroyed., 2' This will be the first case in
Illinois involving parental rights to frozen embryos to be decided.
This article will examine public policy, statutory and Illinois
common law pertinent to this issue. The background will examine
policy, statutes and other state court decisions on custody of
cryopreserved embryos following divorce of the gamete providers. The
analysis and impact section will analyze appropriate case decisions
under relevant Illinois law and consider how those cases, as well as
policy and other state's statutes, will affect similar future situations in
Illinois.
BACKGROUND
"For of course," said Mr. Foster, "in the vast majority of
cases, fertility is merely a nuisance. One fertile ovary in
twelve hundred - that would really be quiet sufficient for our
purposes. But we want to have a good choice. And of course
one must always leave an enormous margin of safety."
2
'
Statutes and Policy Pertaining to IVF
Fertility Clinic Success Rate & Certification Act of 1992
IVF is only minimally regulated on the federal level. The Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (the Act)- required
the CDC to develop a certification procedure for IVF clinics and
laboratories, and to compile IVF clinic pregnancy success statistics?
In addition to standardizing the reporting of pregnancy success rates,
the Act also sought to "assure consistent performance of ART
procedures, quality assurance, and adequate recordkeeping at each
certified embryo laboratory." '24 However, clinic certification and
reporting are voluntary under the Act, with the only penalty for
2 1ALDouS Hu=, BRAVE NEiW WORLD & BRAVE NEW WVoRD REvisrrED 3 (1960).
22See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 -263a-7 (1994).
23See id
24See Katz, supra note 8, at 632 (citing Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductie
Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. REV. 609, 642-43 (1997)).
20001
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noncompliance being public identification as a program that has failed
to do so."
American Fertility Society Guidelines
In 1986, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
published a report establishing ethical guidelines for IVF.2 6  While
deciding that IVF is "ethically acceptable, 2 7 the Committee chose to
differentiate the earliest stages of embryonic development from those
later stages, where major organs begin to form.2" In comparing legal
and moral viewpoints, the Committee referred to embryos in the early
developmental stage as pre-embryos; however, the definition was free
of any intention to "imply a moral evaluation of the pre-embryo.""
Furthermore, while an embryo deserves greater respect than accorded
other human tissue, since it has the potential to become a human
person, it is not accorded the respect of an actual human being. 30
However, this human potential limits "the circumstances in which a
pre-embryo may be discarded or used in research"'" and the statute
makes clear that embryos should not be treated as a person because of a
lack of features of personhood, individual development, and the
possibility of never reaching the full biological potential. 2 Therefore,
25See 42 U.S.C. §263a-5(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1994).
26Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY AND STERILITY iii (1986) [hereinafter FERTILITY AND
STERIL Y].
271d. at 33S.
28Sylvia S. Mader, BIOLOGY, 914 (6th ed. 1998). ("Following fertilization, the zygote
undergoes cleavage, which is cell division without growth. DNA replication and mitotic cell
division occur repeatedly, and the cells get smaller with each cell division. Fertilization occurs
in the upper third of an oviduct,.. .and cleavage begins as the embryo passes down this tube to
the uterus." Id. at 923. "Gastrulation occurs during the second week. The inner cell mass now
has flattened into the embryonic disk, composed of two layers of cells: ectoderm above and
endoderm below. Once the embryonic disk elongates to form the primitive streak, similar to
that found in birds, the third germ layer, mesoderm, forms by invagination of cells along the
streak... It is possible to relate the development of future organs to these germ layers." Id at
924.).
2 9FERTILITY AND STERILITY, supra note 26, at vii.
3 See id. at 29S-30S.
311d. at 77S.
'
2See id. at 29S-30S.
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while preembryos are entitled to "profound respect," such respect does
not entitle the embryo to full moral and legal rights accorded to full
persons.33 Similar to the Act, compliance with the American Fertility
Society's guidelines is purely voluntary.
Louisiana Statutes
Comparing various state laws regarding IVF, Louisiana has the most
comprehensive and restrictive law. 4 A viable embryo is a "judicial
person which shall not be intentionally destroyed." A non-viable in
vitro fertilized human ovum is one that "fails to develop further over a
thirty-sLx hour period, except when the embryo is in a state of
cryopreservation. 35  Such an ovum then, is not property of the
physician, VF clinic, or the gamete donors, and can sue or be sued, "
although the state does not award inheritance rights unless the embryo
develops into a child born in a live birth.37  A guardian may be
appointed to safeguard a fertilized ovum's legal rights in the event of
the following:
[T]he in vitro fertilization patients fail to express their
identity, then the physician shall be deemed to be the
temporary guardian of the in vitro fertilized human ovum
until adoptive implantation can occur. A court.. .may appoint
a curator, upon motion of the in vitro fertilization patients,
their heirs or physicians who cause in vitro fertilization to be
performed, to protect the in vitro fertilized human ovum's
rights.
3S
33See id at 30S.
34See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-33 (West 1991) (deeming an IVF embr'o "a
biological human being" which is not property of the physician twho acts as the agent of
fertilization, or the facility which employs him, or the donors of the sperm and ovum).35LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1991).
36See LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 9:124 (West 1991) (deeming an IVF-created human ovum
a "judicial person" who is entitleld]" to sue or be sued).37See LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 9:133 (West 1991) (explaining that although a human
embryo is a "judicial person" it does not have inheritance rights until born).3SLA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West 1991).
2000]
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The statute requires all pre-embryos be transferred to a uterus, and
"[i]f the in vitro fertilization parents remove by notarial act, their
parental rights for in utero implantation, then the in vitro fertilized
human ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation."" The
biological parents may choose between their own implantation or allow
their embryos to be "adopted," thereby eliminating the ability to avoid
genetic parenthood.40
Other States' Statutes
Missouri's abortion statute contains a preamble that states "the life of
each human being begins at conception," with "unborn children
hav[ing] protectable interests in life, health, and well-being."'" The
United States Supreme Court held this language, at least with regards to
tort law, as a constitutional protection offered to unborn children.4"
No other state has such extensive statutory protection of human
embryos. However, the death of a fetus in a nonabortion procedure
may be punished as a homicide in some states.43 For example,
Minnesota defines an unborn child as "the unborn offspring of a human
being conceived, but not yet born,'" and provides for a maximum
punishment of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder of the
unborn.45
In Virginia, pre-embryos are considered the property of the
gamete-donors, and the IVF clinic's legal rights and duties with respect
to the gamete-donors are those of a bailee. 6  In Florida, parties
undergoing IVF must provide for, as part of a written agreement, the
disposition of all pre-zygote material in the event of the parties' deaths,
'9LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:129 & 9:130 (West 1991).40See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:129 & 9:130 (West 1991).
41MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1 (West Supp. 1993) (It has been argued that this statement
conflicts with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), holding that a state could not adopt its own
theory of when life began in order to regulate abortions).
42See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 494 (1989).
43See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (Mass. 1984) (holding a viable
fetus will fall within the definition of a "person" as used in the state's fehicular homicide
statute).
44MINN. STAT. AN. § 609.266(a) (West 1987).
45See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(1) (West 1987).
46See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421,425 (E.D.Va.1989).
[Vol. 3:307
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divorce or other unforeseen circumstance.47 In New Hampshire, both
gamete providers must undergo medical exams and counseling. In
addition, there is a fourteen-day limit for the ex utero maintenance of
pre-zygotes. 5
Illinois Statutes
The Illinois statute reads as follows:
[N]o person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced
by the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm
unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus
thereby produced. Intentional violation of this section is a
Class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this subsection (7) is
intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro
fertilization."9
In addition, the Illinois statute makes it a crime to kill an unborn
child other than by a lawful abortion, defining an unborn child as "any
individual of the human species from fertilization until birth.""3
Finally, while the Illinois statute allows for the harvesting and
implantation related to IVF, the overall language provides dubious
direction as to what to do with remaining pre-embryonic material.
Courts, then, are forced to define the word "fetus" when faced with a
custody issue pertaining to frozen embryos.
Case Law
Davis v. Davis 5'
After five ectopic pregnancies, Mrs. Davis had her remaining fallopian
tube ligated52 and began the process of IVF. However, after seven
47See FLA. STAT. AN. § 742.17 (West 1997).
4SSeeNH REv. STAT. ANN. §168-B: 13-15, 18 (Supp. 1992),
49720 ILCS 51016(7) (West 1993).
'0720 ILCS 519-1.2(3)(b) (West 1993).
51See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 5S8 (Tenn.1992). cer. denicd, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
2000)
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failed IVF attempts, which cost over $35,000,"3 the Davis' sought to
obtain a child through adoption. 4 When adoption failed, the Davis'
attempted IVF once again, using cryopreservation to treat extra ova
removed during the procedure." Doctors implanted two of the embryos
into Mrs. Davis's uterus, but neither resulted in a pregnancy. 6 The
clinic froze the remaining seven embryos for future implantation
attempts." However, prior to subsequent implantation Mrs. Davis's
husband changed his mind and filed for divorce. 8 The single contested
issue in the divorce was disposition of the seven remaining pre-
embryos.59 Mr. Davis sought to leave the pre-embryos in their frozen
state, while Mrs. Davis wanted to become pregnant with the embryos."°
The trial court utilized the doctrine of parens patriae" in the decision,
and awarded "custody" of the embryos to Mrs. Davis. 2 The court
rejected the guidelines of the American Fertility Society as legally
nonbinding and only appropriate for intra-professional use."3 The trial
court took special issue with the Society's term for "pre-embryo,"' 4 and
52See id. at 591. See also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 876 (25th ed. 1990)
(defining ligation as a procedure whereby the fallopian tubes are constricted by means of a
tightly tied thread in order to prevent conception).
3See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
54See id.
55See id. at 592.
56See id.
57See id.
5 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592 (noting that Mr. Davis filed for divorce in February,
1989; the aspiration and implantation were performed in December, 1988).
59See Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at * I (Cir. Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989).60See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
6
'See BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (1996) (defining parens patriae. Literally,
"parent of the country," and entails the state must care for those who cannot take care of
themselves. Applying such to child custody determinations, requires the state to assume the
role of the guardian, acting to protect the best interests of the child).
62See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589
63See FERTILrIY AND STERILITY, supra note 26, at iii.
64See Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *6-7 (contrasting the American Fertility Society
definition of a "pre-embryo," a zygote up to 14 days after fertilization, with the trial court's
definition, a pre-embryo consists of largely undifferentiated cells having no organs or nervous
system. Under the court's definition, a pre-embryo would become an embryo when it attaches
itself to the uterine wall and begins to develop. Therefore, the Davis' frozen embryos
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instead chose a more tenuous position, ascertaining that a human
embryo's cells are unique from the moment of fertilization, and that
human life begins at conception.65 This controversial position provided
the basis for parens patriae control for the pre-embryos. Since the
Davis' had produced human children in vitro, the court reasoned the
human embryos could not be property." Therefore, the court held the
Davis' embryos should be permitted the opportunity to come to term
through implantation in their mother.
67
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed on the basis that
"[t]he trial court ignored the public policy implicit in the Tennessee
statutes, the holdings of the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the
teachings of the U.S. Supreme Court.""3 Rather, the appellate court,
relying on York v. Jones,69 vested Mr. and Mrs. Davis with "joint
control" of the embryos, each w~ith an "equal voice" over their
disposition. 70 The case was appealed to the Tennessee Supreme
Court.7'
technically were pre-embryos, having no organ or nervous system development and unattached
to any uterine wall).65See id at *9.
6
'See i d
67See id at *1, * 11.
6SDavis v. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205, 2206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept, 13, 1990) (e plhning
that the first ground for reversal was the violation of Mr. Davis' constitutional right to centrol
his reproduction. The trial court's grant to Mrs. Davis of complete control over the embb oz
would force Mr. Davis to become a parent against his vill. Such v:as deemed an
"impermissible state action in violation of [a] constitutionally protected fight not to beget a
child where no pregnancy has taken place." Id citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U S 535
(1942); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt% .Baird, 405 U S
438 (1972) The second ground for reversal, found after review of state statute:, %,,a: no le2al
foundation for the trial court's decision that human life began at conception. State Vrongful
death statutes do not allow for a wrongful death action for an unborn fetus, and rennc2e
murder and assault statutes, while providing for an attack or homicide of a viable fetus a a
crime, held that abortion of nonviable fetus was not. In fact, abortions of non' zable fetuce-
were legal during the first trimester of pregnancy in Tennessee. See Davis, 1990 WL 13037, at
*2. 69See York v. Jones, 117 F. Supp. 421, 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (involing a dia2recement
between the progenitors of a frozen pre-zygote and a Virginia IVF facility that refu~ed to
transfer the pre-zygote to a California IVF center. The court enforced the "parentc" rights
using the theory of bailment).
70See Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. at 2206.
7'See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 5SS (Tenn. 1992).
2000]
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The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed two factors of the case.
First, when the Davis' first enrolled in the IVF program, the informed
consent contained no written agreement concerning the deposition of
any unused embryos." Second, no Tennessee statute addressed this
issue.73 The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded the decision should
be determined by "weighing the relative interests of each party to the
dispute. 74 Using the American Fertility Society guidelines, 5 the court
declared that "preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or
'property' but occupy an interim category that entitles them special
respect because of their potential for human life. 76 This meant that
while Mr. Davis and Mrs. Davis did not have a "true property interest,"
their shared interest was somewhat in "the nature of ownership,"
providing for a "decision-making authority concerning the disposition
of embryos. 77  In this context, the court decided that contingency
agreements concerning the disposition of unused embryos, executed
prior to undergoing IVF procedures, should be presumed valid and
strictly enforced.7" The court also noted such "informed consent"
contracts failed to be truly informed because of the impossibility to
anticipate all possible emotional and psychological events related to
IVF.7 9 Therefore, such agreements should contain provisions for
modification. 0 The court decided that, since the record failed to
declare an agreement regarding the disposition of any unused embryos,
Mr. Davis intended to pursue reproduction outside the confines of a
martial relationship with Mrs. Davis, and Mrs. Davis no longer wished
72 See id. at 590.
73See id.
741d. at 591.75See FERTILrrY AND STERILITY, supra note 26 at vii.
76Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
77d
78See id.
79See id.
SOSee id. at 597 (suggesting that modifications, in the event of an unforeseen
circumstance or unexpected reaction, should be agreed to by both members of the couple and
not become a unilateral decision of one person).
[Vol. 3:307
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to implant the embryos in her own uterus, the reliance doctrine on
contract law was inappropriate."
The court answered the question of procreational autonomy by
using the Tennessee State constitution, the Tennessee Declaration of
Rights, and the parties' constitutional right to privacy.' A right to
procreational autonomy is actually composed of two rights of equal
significance: the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation. 3
Therefore, "Mrs. Davis and Mr. Davis must be seen as entirely
equivalent [contributors of genetic material]."s The court balanced
Mrs. Davis' right to procreate or donate the embryos to another couple
for implantation against the impact of unwanted parenthood upon Mr.
Davis." Usually the party wishing to avoid procreation prevails,
assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving
parenthood by means other then use of the pre-embryos in question."
While Mrs. Davis had endured a significant amount of physical and
mental strain associated with the IVF procedure, the court decided that
Mrs. Davis' privacy interest was more compelling." The absence of a
preliminary agreement and Mrs. Davis' intention not to use the
embryos herself tipped the scale.S Based on this reasoning the
appellate court's decision was affirmeds 9
Kass v. Kass'
Maureen Kass (plaintiff) married Steven Kass on July 4, 1988, and they
immediately began to plan for a family.9' Mrs. Kass had difficulty
conceiving, and after eighteen months of unsuccessful natural and
artificial insemination, Mr. and Mrs. Kass enrolled in the Long Island
"'See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
8See id at 598-600.
S3See id. at 601.
84Id
SSSee id at 604.
S6See Davis, 842 SW.2d at 604.
87See id
SSSee i
S9See id at 604-05.
99See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
91See id. at 175.
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IVF program at John Mather Memorial Hospital.9" In March 1990,
Mrs. Kass underwent the process of egg retrieval five separate times
and had fertilized eggs implanted on nine different occasions. 93 She
became pregnant twice.94 The first pregnancy ended in a miscarriage
and the other was surgically terminated due to an ectopic pregnancy. 9S
After ten unsuccessful attempts at IVF, costing over $75,000, and
encompassing more than three years, the Kass' decided on one final
attempt. This final attempt included, for the first time, cryopreservation
of the surplus embryos.96 On May 12, 1993, the couple signed four
consent forms drafted by the hospital.97 Shortly afterwards, doctors
92See id.
93See id. at 175-76.
94See id. at 176.
95See Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 176.
96See id.
97See id. at 176-77 ("Each form begins on a new page, with its own caption and 'Patient
Name.' The first two forms, 'GENERAL INFORMED CONSENT FORM NO. I: IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER' and 'ADDENDUM NO. 1-1,' consist of 12
single-spaced typewritten pages explaining the procedure, its risks and benefits, at several
points indicating that, before egg retrieval could begin, it was necessary for the parties to make
informed decisions regarding disposition of the fertilized eggs. ADDENDUM NO. 1-I
concludes as follows:
'We understand that it is general IVF Program Policy, as medically determined
by our IVF physician, to retrieve as many eggs as possible and to inseminate
and transfer 4 of those mature eggs in this IVF cycle, unless our IVF physician
determines otherwise. It is necessary that we decide... [now] how excess eggs
are to be handled by the IVF Program and how many embryos to transfer. We
are to indicate our choices by signing out initials where noted below.
I.We consent to the retrieval of as many eggs as medically determined by our
IVF physician. If more eggs are retrieved than can be transferred during this
IVF cycle, we direct the IVF Program to take the following action (choose
one):
(a) The excess eggs are to be inseminated and cryopreserved for possible use
by us during a later IVF cycle. We understand that our choice of this option
requires us to complete an additional Consent Form for Cryopreservation'
The 'additional Consent Form for Cyropreservation,' a seven page, single-spaced
typewritten document, is also in two parts. The first, "INFORMED CONSENT
FORM NO. 2: CRYOPRESERVATION OF HUMAN PRE-ZYGOTES," provides:
'III. Disposition of Pre-Zygotes.
'We understand that our frozen pre-zygotes will be stored for a maximum of 5
years. We have the principal responsibility to decide the disposition of our
frozen pre-zygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage
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retrieved sixteen eggs from Mrs. Kass.S Nine of these eggs became
pre-zygotes, four of which were transferred to Mrs. Kass' sister who
volunteered to be a surrogate mother, and the rest were frozen."
Unfortunately, the surrogacy transfer failed.t' After learning that Mrs.
Kass' sister no longer was willing to be a surrogate mother, the Kass'
decided to dissolve their marriage.' Less than a month after signing
the IVF consent forms, Mr. and Mrs. Kass executed an uncontested
for any purpose without the written consent of both of us, consistent with the
policies of the IVF program and applicable law. In the event of divorce, %e
understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined
in a property settlement and will be released as directed by the order of a court
of competentjurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt
to initiate a pregnancy, we understand that we may determine the disposition
of our frozen pre-zygotes remaining in storage.'
'The possibility of our death or any other unforeseen circumstances that
may result in neither of us being able to determine the disposition of an,
stored frozen pre-zygotes requires that we now indicate out w ishes.
THESE IMPORTANT DECISIONS MUST BE DISCUSSED WITH OUR
IVF PHYSICIAN AND OUR WISHES MUST BE STATED (BEFORE
EGG RETRIEVAL) ON THE ATTACHED ADDENDUM NO. 2-1,
STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION. THIS STATEMENT OF
DISPOSITION MAY BE CHANGED ONLY BY OUR SIGNING
ANOTHER STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION WHICH IS FILED WITH
THE IVF PROGRAM.'
The second part, titled 'INFORMED CONSENT FORM NO. 2-ADDENDUM NO.
2-1: CRYOPRESERVATION-STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION,' states:
We understand that it is the IVF Program Policy to obtain our informed
consent to the number of pre-zygotes, which are to be cryoprescrved, and
to the disposition of excess cryopreserved pre-zygotes. Ie are to indicate
our choices by signing our initials where noted below.
1. We consent to cryopreservation of all pre-zygotes that are not
transferred during this IVF cycle for possible use by us in a future IVF
cycle.
2. In the event that we no longer wish to initiate pregnancy or are unable to
make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes,
we now indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct
the IVF program to (choose one):
(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for
biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program') (emphasis in
original).
9
'
3See id at 177.
99See id
'GoSee Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
'
01See id
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divorce agreement, stating that "the disposition of the five frozen pre-
zygotes at Mather Hospital is that they should be disposed of [in] the
manner outlined in our consent form."' 2 Neither Mr. Kass nor Mrs.
Kass would state any claim to the material. 0 3
Three weeks after this divorce agreement, Mrs. Kass requested
that neither the hospital nor the physician destroy or release the
remaining pre-embryos." 4 She further requested that she be awarded
sole custody of the frozen fertilized eggs.1"5 This request was prompted
by renewed interest of Mrs. Kass to attempt another implantation. 0 6
Mrs. Kass moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining Mr. Kass
from destroying the pre-zygotes, and Mr. Kass moved to enjoin Mrs.
Kass from implanting the fertilized eggs."7
The lower court enjoined both parties from gaining access to the
embryos and awarded Mrs. Kass custody of the five pre-embryos.'
The court reasoned that disposition of this material was a matter
exclusively within the woman's discretion according to Roe iv Wade. 09
In granting her custody, the court directed Mrs. Kass to implant the pre-
zygotes within a medically reasonable time."0 Mr. Kass appealed."'
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the trial court ruling and
granted Mr. Kass' motion for specific performance of an informed
consent previously signed by both Mr. and Mrs. Kass."2 This informed
consent agreement stipulated that, in the event of a divorce and unless
previously specified by both parties, all remaining pre-embryos would
be used for scientific research and discarded by the IVF program."3
102 Id.
103See id.
'
04See id.
'
0
°See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
106See id.
'
07See id.
'OSSee id.
'
09See id.
"
0 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
1"See Kass v. Kass, 235 A.2d 150, 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
"
2See id. at 182-83.
113See id. at 152.
[Vol. 3:307
CUSTODY OF FROZEN EMBRYOS
In his concurring opinion, Judge Friedman, argued that certain
paragraphs were phrased ambiguously."4 For example he pointed to
the following sections: "[I]n the event of a divorce, we [the undersigned
parties] understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must
be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed
by order of a court of competent jurisdiction,"" 5 and "[t]he possibility
of death or any other unforeseen circumstances that may result in
neither of us being able to determine the disposition of any stored
frozen pre-zygotes."' 6  Judge Friedman found the only specific
dispositional language in the entire informed consent document was
where the parties jointly state their intention to permit the IVF program
to retain the pre-zygotes for approved research and investigation, in the
event the couple was unable to decide." 7
Interpretation of these phrases according to Roe and Planned
Parenthood would weigh in favor of women's constitutional right to
bodily integrity. Another interpretation would recognize a proprietary
interest in the five pre-embryos. However, the Appeals Court held the
parties prior statement of intent with regard to the pre-embryos was
unencumbered by any preceding or broad right. Such a signed
document should be given a clear and unambiguous reading related to
the disposition of this pre-embryonic material.
ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
Several interrelated issues require discussion when dealing with a
question of custody of frozen embryos in Illinois. Currently no case
law exists that specifically addresses this issue, therefore only loosely
analogous Illinois law is available to shed light on the problem. The
1999 case involving Margaret Hale and Todd Ginestra will be the first
to decide the custody status of frozen embryos in Illinois. The Cook
County Circuit Court will most likely utilize the analysis in the Dnais
and Kass decisions when applying relevant Illinois statutory law. No
'"See id. at 163.
"5M at 164.
"
6Kass, 235 A.2d at 164.
"See i d at 165.
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Illinois statute deals directly with the issue of determining custody of
frozen embryos. However, the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 (the
Abortion Act)118 defines fertilization and conception as meaning "the
fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm, which shall be
deemed to have occurred at the time when it is known a spermatozoon
has penetrated the cell membrane of the ovum."...9 Such a definition is
descriptive of the fourth phase of IVF. 20 In addition, the Abortion Act
broadly defines a fetus as "an individual organism of the species homo
[sic] sapiens [at] fertilization," '121 while viability is "that stage of fetal
development when.. .there is reasonable likelihood of sustained
survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without artificial
support.""' The definition of viability could arguably extend to IVF,
since the fertilized embryo may theoretically have infinite survivability
sustained by the artificial means of the cryogenic freezer.2
However, a more troublesome definition is the one chosen by the
Illinois legislature to define fetus. The Illinois legislature defines a
fetus as a human being from the point of conception, which is in
opposition to Roe.'24 This definition, however, is clearly similar to that
used in Louisiana. 2 5 Under Louisiana law, an IVF embryo is defined
as "a biological human being", a "judicial person" who can sue or be
sued. 26  A fetus, therefore, could not be considered property of the
gamete providers in either Louisiana or Illinois. Illinois law also fails
to consider application of the American Fertility Society guidelines
"
8See 720 ILCS 510 (West 1993).
"9720 ILCS 510 § 2(5) (West 1993).
120See Lai, supra note 3 at 520-22 and text accompanying note 11.
12720 ILCS 510 § 2(6) (West 1993).
22ld. at § 2(1).
123See Kass v Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998).
124See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973) and Geoffery Stone, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW at 958 (3d ed. 1996) ("Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life
begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a
compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins. When those trained [in] medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer").
125See LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-133 (West 1991) and text accompanying note 37.
'
26See id.; LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124 (West 1991).
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definition of a fetus. Under these guidelines, to avoid implying "a
moral evaluation of the [embryo],"' an embryo, while accorded
greater respect than human tissue, was not given the respect of an actual
human being.12 By forsaking the safety of Roe and the logical middle
ground of the American Fertility Society guidelines, Illinois' definition
of a fetus creates an unforgiving judicial tightrope for a court to walk,
balancing the issues associated with custody of frozen embryos. In
Charles v. Carey,"2 9 the constitutionality of this definition of a fetus
was indeed questioned. The court held that a fetus as defined by the
Illinois Abortion Act was not "impermissibly vague" and that the
"plain meaning of [the provision] containing [that term was]
manifest."'1
30
Smith v. Hartigan3 1 provided a second challenge to the
constitutionality of the Abortion Act. The Smiths wished to participate
in IVF but were told that under the Illinois Abortion Act'' "[a]ny
person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum by a
human sperm outside the body of a living human female shall, with
regard to the human being thereby produced, be deemed to have the
care and custody of [that] child."'3 Mrs. Smith's treating physician
was concerned that after successfully performing an IVF procedure on
Mrs. Smith, he and not the Smiths would have parental responsibility
for the child under the Illinois Abortion Act.'34 The Smiths brought
both injunctory and summary judgment motions on the basis that the
Act prohibited IVF and therefore was unconstitutional. 3 ' The State
contended that Section 6(7) "both permits [IVF] and preserves the
constitutional rights of women who become pregnant either naturally or
through [IVF] to terminate their pregnancies,"'' while "protect[ing] the
127See FERTIMTY AND STERILTY, supra note 26, at vii.
'2See id at 29S-30S.
129See Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 377 (1983).
'"See id at 380.
131See Smith v. Hartigan, 566 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ii. 1933).
'2See 720 ILCS 51016(7)(West 1993).
'3Smith, 566 F. Supp. at 159.
3 4See id.
13'See ia at 160.
"6M at 161.
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State's interest in human life by prohibiting willful exposure of
embryos to harm, [such] as by destructive laboratory
experimentation.' 3 7 The Illinois Supreme Court decided the State's
construction of the Abortion Act pertaining to the scope of IVF was
significantly limited.'38 In addition, the court held, based on the State's
position, no constitutional controversy existed under Article III of the
Illinois constitution, since the IVF procedure the "plaintiffs wish[ed] to
follow did not violate the statute."' 39  Therefore, the statute neither
prohibited IVF nor would the Smiths be prosecuted for participating in
IVF.
The final issue before the court in Smith was whether statutory
construction of the Abortion Act prevented an IVF procedure called
"superovulation."' 4 °  However, due to the scientific and medical
complexity of this technique, the court chose not to "render any
decision on the constitutionality of the [IVF] provision at [that]
time."'' As a result, the plaintiffs motions for injunctive relief and
summary judgment were denied, with the cause being dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' The court also conveniently
avoided the constitutional nature of the phrase "experimental research
to improve IVF procedures, such as cryopreservation."'43
A similar challenge was raised in Lifchez v. Hartigan.44  In
Lifchez, several physicians who performed IVF in Illinois brought a
class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois
Abortion Law applicable to IVF. 45 The plaintiffs contended that use of
the terms "experimentation" and "therapeutic" violated due process
rights of the Fourteenth Amendment by making the statute so vague
that a physician could not be sure whether he was criminally liable. 146
'"id.
'3sSee Smith, 566 F. Supp. at 163.
139Id.
"
40See id.
1411id
142See id.
143Smith, 566 F. Supp. at 163.
144See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (1990).
145See id. at 1363.
146See id. at 1364.
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In addition, the plaintiffs contended the statute unduly restricted a
woman's fundamental right of privacy to make reproductive choices as
established under Roe. 147 The court in Lifchez affirmed both of the
plaintiff's claims.
Therefore, in spite of strict statutory construction of the Illinois
Abortion Law, the courts have consistently chosen to interpret IVF
procedures with a decided pro-Roe consideration. An Illinois court
could now face the question whether a prospective mother's decision to
undergo additional implantation of her own previously harvested but
now fertilized eggs represents a valid extension of a woman's right to
personal autonomy under Roe. In addition, a court could also be asked
whether, in the event of a divorce, an informed consent agreement to
undergo IVF will allow for residual property rights, executable by
either parent, over harvested but unused embryos.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania it Casey,"'a
woman's right to personal autonomy, initially set dowm in Roe, was
described as "a rule of personal autonomy and bodily integrity... [that]
recogniz[es] limits on governmental power to mandate medical
treatment or to bar its rejection."'49 However, it would be a mistake for
the Illinois courts to extend this argument as a justification for custody
of frozen embryos. A woman's right to exercise virtually exclusive
control over her own body is not implicated in the IVF process, until
such a time as implantation actually occurs, for then it will become her
bodily integrity that will be at risk. The existence of such a right would
be tantamount to one person "compelling procreational assistance from
another... [T]he right is an illusion even if enforced because the person
who implants the [embryo] will always be a woman who will have an
automatic veto over the pregnancy as part of her right to an abortion.""'
Rather, in determining custody of frozen embryos, the Illinois courts
should balance the parties' interests in seeking and avoiding
procreation as recognized originally in Davis and extended in Kass.
'
47See id at 1363.
148See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 857, 857 (1992).
1491d at 833.
'
5
"William Sieck, In vitro Fertilization And The Right To Procreate, The Rght To No,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 435, 480 (1998).
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This "interest balancing test" would "include appellant's independent
ability to support the child and the sincerity of her emotional
investment... as well as the burdens attendant upon a respondent's
unwanted fatherhood and his motivations for objecting to
parenthood."''
However, the interest balancing test utilized in both Davis and
Kass provided greater support to the party wishing to avoid procreation
when the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving
parenthood by other means outside the use of the embryos to achieve
pregnancy.'52 In fact, in Kass, the exclusion criteria for the interest
balancing test was broadened so "that no person or entity should be
allowed to interfere with another person's decision not to have
offspring before the point of viability. 15 3 This language removed the
only exception of the Davis court's balancing test. For example, in a
divorce proceeding, the wife would take the position of wanting the
embryos implanted in her own body instead of a surrogate. It would
seem then, when the fundamental right to procreate clashes with the
right to avoid procreation:
[T]he party seeking to implant the pre-zygotes [usually the
wife] should be required to establish as a threshold matter
that she cannot undergo IVF with a new partner or a sperm
donor because she has lost her ability to ovulate or has some
other major medical contraindication to egg
retrieval... [M]ere discomfort, expense, or other potentially
surmountable difficulties should not suffice to defeat
the... fundamental right to avoid biological fatherhood in a
case of this sort.' 54
Therefore, prior to implantation, an Illinois court should hold that no
relevant or appropriate consideration under a woman's right to personal
autonomy forms a basis to determine custody of frozen embryos.
t5'Kass v. Kass, 235 A.2d 150, 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
152See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 591, 604 (Tenn. 1992).53Kass, 235 A.2d at 167.
1541Id.
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In Kass, one of the dissenting opinions urged the legislature to
implement guidelines to facilitate resolution of custody conflicts over
frozen embryos in subsequent cases.'55 The Illinois legislature should
strongly consider such action, thereby effectively removing decisional
capacity from the Illinois courts. In writing guidelines for Illinois, the
legislature must decide if in vitro embryos are accorded greater rights
than in vivo embryos naturally conceived in the womb. Since Roe
accords a woman the fundamental right to terminate an in vivo
pregnancy, it would make sense to provide the right for termination of
an in vitro embryo.156 In addition, the legislature should also provide a
means of resolving disputes between the gamete providers. Some may
reason that the woman should generally be granted custody by virtue of
the tremendous physiological burden placed on her by the IVF
procedures. Others may reach similar conclusions by recognizing that
embryo disposition may be legally based upon one party's desire for
implantation and physiological capability of doing so. However, a
statute should not restrict the disposition of embryos based on a claim
of protecting embryos as a viable human life. If one extends a
constitutional right to avoid procreation to IVF procedures, then
statutes which regulate IVF procedures could not restrict the disposition
of embryos by creating an undue burden on the choice of an individual
to dispose of his or her reproductive material.
In the absence of legislative guidance, custody determinations of
fr6zen embryos in Illinois may also draw upon possible concepts of
property. However, this argument may again be problematic under the
Illinois Abortion Act and its definition of a fetus. Due to the embryo's
potential for personhood, a "special respect status" of the embryo
would be more appropriate definition."s7 A special respect status for the
embryo would also be in accord with the American Fertility Society
Guidelines and provide the constitutional foundation to build a property
rights argument in Illinois. Using this revised "special respect status"
'See id at 179.
15See Nicole L. Cucci, Constitutional Implications of In vitro Fertiliation, 72 Sr.
JoHN'S L. REv. 417, 445 (1998) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 033, 370-71
(1992).
'
57 t at 442.
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definition for a fetus, an Illinois court should, when considering
embryos as property, utilize the Davis decision when considering
embryos as property. Specifically, following Davis the court should
affirm the rights of both gamete providers as equivalent, but provide
that property rights may also be relinquished either intentionally or
accidentally in a contract."'
In addition, when a contract dispute arises, the court often tries to
determine the parties' intent. In the event of such a contingency, an
Illinois court should take direction from the Kass decision. The Kass'
twice unequivocally stated, in both the informed consent and in the
uncontested divorce, their intent concerning the manner of disposition
of the five embryos. 9 In fact, the court found on page six of the
informed consent, dispositional language whereby "the parties jointly
state their intention to permit the IVF program to retain the pre-zygotes
for approved research and investigation in the event they are unable to
make a decision regarding [such a] disposition."'60 However, the court
found based on the language on page six that since "they were no
longer able to render the single, joint decision regarding the disposition
of the pre-zygotes"'' the pre-zygote material "must be retained and
used by the IVF Program for scientific purposes, [which was] a result
consistent with the parties expressed wishes."'62  Therefore, where
contractual language can clearly state the intent of all the parties to an
IVF procedure, such language will be deemed controlling unless
appropriately modified.
Such a clean approach was also utilized in the appellate decision in
Kass.163 In the appeal, dispositional authority was decided according to
'
58See Kass, 235 A.2d at 152 (illustrating that, as a general rule, for a preceding
condition to operate, it must be clearly intended by specific, clear language in the agreement.
In a situation with ambiguous language, (e.g., the phrase "other unforeseen circumstances that
may result in neither of us being able to determine the disposition of any stored frozen pre-
zygotes"), the law will not allow construction of the phrase to create a condition precedent).
'
59See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176-77 (N.Y. 1998).
'
6 Kass, 235 A.2d at 158.
6
aisd.1621d
"
161See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
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the original consent agreement, which was valid and binding on all
parties. 64 The court in Kass stated:
[I]t [is] particularly important that courts seek to honor the
parties' expressions of choice, made before disputes erupt,
with the parties' overall direction always uppermost in the
analysis. Knowing that advance agreements will be enforced
underscores the seriousness and integrity of the consent
process; advance agreements as to disposition would have
little purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the
parties continued to agree. 1
65
Neither party in Kass disputed the intent of the original consent
form, nor the document's ultimate legality."" In addition, the Kass'
agreed they had freely and knowingly entered into the informed
consent. 67 The only argument advanced by Mrs. Kass was ambiguity
of the language in the paragraph pertaining to disposition of the
embryos in event of divorce.6S However, using a "four comers"
approach to interpret contracts, the court held the Kass' clearly
expressed their intent and under the circumstances pertaining to a
divorce "the pre-zygotes would be donated to the IVF program for
research purposes."'69  The Kass court stated that "[a]mbiguity is
determined by looking within the four comers of the document, not to
outside sources."' 70 Here the parties' intent must be determined from
the face of the agreement itself and courts, in looking for ambiguity,
[S]hould examine the entire contract and consider the
relation of the parties and the circumstances under which it
was executed. Particular words should be considered, not as
if isolated from the context, but in light of the obligation as a
164See id
165i
'
66See id
167See idt
16SSee Kass, 696 N.E.2d at ISO.
1691d at 181.
170Idat 180.
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whole... [florm should not prevail over substance and a
sensible meaning of words should be sought.1
7 1
Therefore, to deal with the problem of custody of frozen embryos
following divorce, new Illinois legislation should make pre-agreements
mandatory, requiring signatures of the couple before any embryos are
frozen. Essentially, the embryo disposition agreements are contracts
that allow gamete providers to specify their intent for resolving possible
future disputes over their frozen embryos. All courts have been
reluctant to enter judgment in this type of dispute, viewing a decision to
undergo an IVF procedure and determination of any remaining embryos
as intensely private and personal matters best resolved by the
perspective parents. In such a context, when all parties have made
careful decisions, all retrospective and prospective choices should be
given the careful, yet deliberate, clothing of the written word. Such
agreements should be valid and enforceable prior to the creation and
cryopreservation of the embryos. An agreement should contain a
waiting period in order for the couple to reflect on the contract and
allow for the possibility of a party changing their mind prior to the IVF
procedure. Both Davis and Kass hold that once embryos have been
created and the gamete providers have expressly agreed such embryos
will be used to reproduce, no party should be allowed to unilaterally
revoke the promise to transfer that embryonic material. However, any
party to the contract wishing to modify the terms of the contract may
legally do so, providing the modified terms are jointly agreed upon.
Also, to avoid undue restriction on contract rights, the power to modify
contract terms should not be limited to occurrence of a contingency.
The agreement should determine the fate of any frozen embryos for a
variety of contingencies, including divorce and embryo destruction.
Sale of embryos should be prohibited and the number of embryos
actually frozen should be limited. The statute should absolve the
gamete donors of all parental responsibilities in the event the embryos
are transferred to another couple. In addition, there should be a
statutory limit to the length of time embryos may remain frozen.
'Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
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Finally, in the event of death of both donors or the onset of menopause
of the female donor, the statute should require disposal or donation of
the embryos. Such statutory criteria provide the much-needed direction
the courts have requested, as well as satisfying the Dais court's
concept of embryos being hybrids of person and property."
One disadvantage of embryo disposition agreements is the
inherent monopoly power residing with IVF providers. Couples
seeking lVF are in a position of being psychologically disadvantaged,
since they are desperate to have a child. As originators or authors of
the contract providing the IVF procedure, lVF clinics hold significant
power over these couples. Under such circumstances, couples may
have few alternatives regarding embryo disposition, therefore such
contracts may actually constitute an adhesion contract.' "IVF clinics
retain power to determine their institutional policies because they are
private institutions. A clinic that is normally opposed to embryo
destruction has no obligation to make this option available to the
gamete providers.""7 Free market dynamics are at the heart of such an
institutional policy. The IVF provider knows if the couple wishes to
have options outside IVF center policy, the couple will have to go
elsewhere. Unfortunately, such a choice may not be realistically viable
for the gamete providers. Therefore, unequal bargaining power only
highlights the need for effective legal guidance for the gamete
providers. Each partner must be fully and completely aware of exactly
what they will each be signing away in regards to their immediate
reproductive future and the future of their potential offspring. Each
"72See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (We conclude that pre-
embryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property.' but occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life. It
follows that any interest that Mrs. Davis and Mr. Davis have in the preembryos in this case is
not a true property interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of ovnerihip. to
the extent that they have decision making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos
within the scope of policy set by the law).
'7See BARRoN'S LEGAL DICTIONARY 11 (1996) (defining an adhesion contract as one
that is so heavily restrictive of one party, while so nonrestrictive of another that doubts arise as
to its representation as a voluntary and uncoerced agreement; implies a grate inequality of
bargaining power).
'
74Christi D. Ahnen, Disputes over Fro:en Enabryos: "ho lins, Who Loscs, and Hol"
Do Me Decide?, 24 CREIGHTONL. REv. 1299, 1354 (1991).
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gamete provider should view this agreement as requiring legal
representation on his or her behalf.
CONCLUSION
Medical technology of today has made the science fiction of A BRAVE
NEW WORLD science fact. Currently, IVF provides a means for
many infertile couples to attain biological parenthood. The problem
with IVF is the ability of the procedure to extend the time period
between conception and implantation in the womb from hours to years.
Such a delay creates situations that are not applicable to natural
fertilization. One situation appearing with increasing frequency is the
impact of divorce on custody of fertilization eggs that have been frozen
for future IVF attempts. Most likely, in the near future, the Illinois
courts or legislature will be required to deal with this issue. Several
states have made attempts to deal with this problem in statutory law.
These attempts have ranged from a direct challenge to Roe v. Wade to
vaguely worded state laws that poorly address the entire process. The
courts, as evidenced in the few rulings dealing with this issue, are
extremely reticent to decide custody of these frozen embryos.
Increasingly, the courts are looking back to the legislature for statutory
direction.
Therefore, new legislation in Illinois should require mandatory
pre-IVF agreements as a means to resolve the problem of embryo
disposition. Signing of an agreement should be required prior to
cryopreserving embryos and should contain a mandatory waiting period
to allow couples to change their decision prior to proceeding with IVF.
The agreement should be dispositive of the embryos for a variety of
contingencies, including divorce and destruction of the embryos.
Ultimately, a defining policy will emerge in Illinois concerning these
rights and liabilities of in vitro fertilization.
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